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Abstract
This paper studies the interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policies, and their joint role
in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run ﬁscal policy
rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say , is backed by the present discounted
value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage
revenue. The parameter characterizes the interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary
authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price
level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with
money. Empirical estimates of are obtained for OECD and developing countries using data on
nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate differences in the degree of ﬁscal
dominance between developed and developing economies. Estimates of correlate positively
with some institutional measures of de facto central bank independence.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31, E42, E50, E63
Bank classiﬁcation: Central bank research; Fiscal policy; Inﬂation: costs and beneﬁts
Résumé
L’auteur étudie l’interdépendance des politiques budgétaire et monétaire ainsi que leur rôle
combiné dans la détermination du niveau des prix. L’État est caractérisé par une règle de politique
budgétaire à long terme selon laquelle une fraction du service de la dette – – est garantie par la
valeur actualisée des excédents primaires présents et futurs, et la fraction restante – 1- – par les
revenus de seigneuriage. Le paramètre mesure l’interdépendance des autorités budgétaire et
monétaire. L’auteur montre que, dans une économie monétaire, la règle en question implique que
le niveau des prix est fonction non seulement du stock de monnaie mais aussi de la part des
emprunts garantie par la création de monnaie. À l’aide des données sur la consommation
nominale, la base monétaire et la dette, l’auteur estime empiriquement le paramètre pour les
membres de l’OCDE et les pays en voie de développement. D’après ses résultats, les deux
groupes d’économies se différencient par leur degré de prépondérance budgétaire. Les estimations
de sont corrélées positivement avec certaines mesures institutionnelles de l’indépendance
effective des banques centrales.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E31, E42, E50, E63
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Recherches menées par les banques centrales; Politique budgétaire;









δ1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies the interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policies, and their joint role
in the determination of the aggregate price level. In general, ﬁscal and monetary policies are linked
through the consolidated government budget constraint. A combination of taxes, new debt issue,
and seigniorage revenue must ﬁnance government expenditures in every period. In terms of the
intertemporal budget constraint, outstanding debt must be backed by a combination of the present
discounted value of current and future primary surpluses and seigniorage revenues. More specif-
ically, this paper investigates if the proportion of debt that is backed by each source of revenue,
primary surplus or seigniorage, matters for the determination of the price level.
The theoretical analysis is carried out in a standard competitive monetary economy. The gov-
ernment is characterized by a long-run ﬁscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding
debt, say δ, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The
remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter δ is structural and summarizes the
degree of interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary authorities in a given institutional setup. It
is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends
not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money.
This paper draws on earlier research by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), extending their work in at
least three directions. First, results are derived using only the long-run ﬁscal policy rule without
having to specify a particular period-by-period rule. This long-run rule is compatible with the
time-stationary rule in Aiyagari and Gertler, but also with other (perhaps not time-stationary)
period-by-period rules. Second, the determination of the price level is characterized at all times,
rather than only at the steady state. Finally, a simple empirical strategy is proposed to construct
estimates of the δ parameter for a cross-country sample of developing and industrialized economies.
In order to understand the importance of the empirical analysis, note that in this model there
is a continuum of ﬁscal regimes indexed by δ. There are two polar cases. First, in the case where
δ =1 ,t h eﬁscal authority backs fully all government debt. Fiscal policy accommodates monetary
policy in the following sense: whenever the monetary authority sells government bonds in the open
market, the ﬁscal authority increases current or future taxes, and/or reduces current or future
expenditures, to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt. The monetary
authority never responds to the increase in the stock of government debt associated with a budget
deﬁcit. Sargent (1982) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) refer to this case as a Ricardian regime. In
this paper, it will be referred to as one of zero ﬁscal dominance or central bank independence.
Second, in the case where δ =0 , the monetary authority backs fully all government debt. In
particular, the monetary authority accommodates the ﬁscal authority whenever a budget deﬁcit
is ﬁnanced with debt. This accommodation takes the form of an increase in current or future
1seigniorage revenues to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt. The
ﬁscal authority is insensitive to monetary policy in that neither taxes nor expenditure react (today
or in the future) to changes in stock of outstanding government debt. Sargent, and Aiyagari and
Gertler refer to this case as a polar Non-Ricardian regime. In this paper, it will be referred to as
one of complete ﬁscal dominance.
Aiyagari and Gertler correctly argue that one cannot distinguish between Ricardian and Non-
Ricardian regimes on the basis of long-run correlations between nominal interest rates and money
growth. The reason is that there exist monetary policy rules for which the Non-Ricardian regimes
(0 ≤ δ<1) generate the same correlation as the Ricardian regime (δ =1 ) . However, we show that
under certain conditions, the dynamics of money, debt, and private consumption allow the direct
estimation of δ and standard statistical inference can be used to draw conclusions regarding the
regime that better describes policy in a given economy. The estimation strategy is based on now
standard results in unit-root econometrics that were not well developed at the time Aiyagari and
Gertler wrote their contribution.
Using data from a sample of developed and developing economies, country-speciﬁc estimates of
δ are constructed . The estimates reveal important cross-country heterogeneity. For instance, the
null hypothesis that δ equals 1 cannot be rejected at standard levels for most industrial (OECD)
countries in the sample, but is more frequently rejected among developing countries. In addition,
only within the subsample of developing countries can we ﬁnd examples for which the null hy-
pothesis that δ equals 0 cannot be rejected. This ﬁndings suggest that ﬁscal dominance is more
common among developing countries, while central bank independence seems to be the case for
most OECD countries, implying that, for OECD countries: (i)t h eﬁscal authority backs most, if
not all, outstanding debt, and (ii) debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price
level. This conclusion is less straightforward for developing economies.
Additional empirical implications of the model are also examined. First, estimates of δ are
compared with measures of central bank independencep r o p o s e di nt h el i t e r a ture. Results indicate
a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between δ a n dt h el e g a la u t o n o m yi n d e xp r o p o s e db yG r i l l i ,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and a negative (also signiﬁcant) correlation, as expected, between
δ and a central bank independence index based on the turnover rate of governors proposed by
Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
In Sargent and Wallace (1981), the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary authorities takes the
form of a coordination game. The central bank could move ﬁrst, determine how much seigniorage
revenue can be raised, and force the ﬁscal authority to follow a policy that satisﬁes the govern-
ment’s consolidated intertemporal budget constraint. Then, a central bank that is committed to
price stability could indeed deliver price stability regardless of ﬁscal policy. Alternatively, the ﬁscal
authority could move ﬁrst by deﬁning the path of the primary surplus. Since higher seigniorage
2revenues would be necessary to avoid explosive debt paths, ﬁscal policy would have an eﬀect on
the price level. Given a predetermined path for the primary surplus, “tight” money today trig-
gers higher interest rates, increases interests rate payments on the government’s debt, and requires
“loose” money later. Rational agents anticipate the future increase in money creation and bid the
price level up today. This is Sargent and Wallace’s unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.T h er e s u l t s
in this paper imply that, for most industrialized countries in the sample, the central bank is the
ﬁrst mover, but this result is less clear for developing economies, where ﬁscal dominance is more
common. That is, in OECD countries, it seems to be the monetary authority that sets its policy
in advance and imposes discipline on the ﬁscal authority.
This work is related to, but conceptually diﬀerent from, the literature on the Fiscal Theory of
the Price Level (FTPL) [see, for example, Woodford (1995) and Cochrane (1998, 2001)]. Under
the FTPL, the price level is determined by the intertemporal budget constraint as the quotient
between the nominal value of the interest bearing debt and the present value of the surplus, that
might include seigniorage revenues. The underlying assumption is that the government’s actions
are not constrained by budgetary issues. Consequently, the intertemporal budget constraint holds
as an equilibrium condition, rather than as a constraint, and only for equilibrium prices. Any
change in ﬁscal policy must impact the price level, regardless of how committed the monetary
authority is to price stability. Both the model presented in this paper and the FTPL predict a
relationship between the price level and ﬁscal variables. However, in this paper it is assumed that
the intertemporal budget constraint is always satisﬁed for any arbitrary sequence of prices, whereas
the FTPL assumes it is an equilibrium condition. This diﬀerence means that the econometric results
presented here should not be interpreted as a formal test of the FTPL.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 outlines
the estimation strategy and reports the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Private Sector
The economy is populated by identical, inﬁnitely-lived consumers with perfect foresight.1 The





βtu(ct,m t/pt,1 − nt), (1)
1The assumption of perfect foresight is not crucial for the theoretical results, but it is analytically convenient.
Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) allow uncertainty but focus on a steady state with constant asset prices. Leeper (1991)
p e r m i t ss h o c k st ot h eﬁscal and monetary policy rules, but output, consumption, and government expenditure are
deterministic.
3where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor and u is strictly increasing in all arguments,
strictly concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions.
In each period, consumers choose consumption (ct), labor (nt), and next-period holdings of
capital (kt),m o n e y(mt) and nominal one-period government debt (bt).T h e v a r i a b l e pt is the
aggregate price level. The time endowment is normalized to one. The population size is constant
and normalized to one. Capital and labor services are rented each period to a representative
competitive ﬁrm that produces output according to a standard neoclassical production function.
The inclusion of real balances (mt/pt) as an argument of the utility function reﬂects the conve-
nience of using money in carrying out transactions. Feenstra (1986) shows the equivalence between
including real balances in the utility function, assuming liquidity costs that appear in the budget
constraint, and introducing a cash-in-advance constraint. In this sense, the approach followed here
to motivate money demand is not restrictive. Since the model is concerned with the composition
of government liabilities, following Woodford (1995), mt is interpreted as the consumer’s holdings
of the monetary base.
A logarithmic and separable instantaneous utility function is assumed because it is analytically
very tractable and allows us to exploit the linearity of the government’s budget constraint:2
u(ct,m t/pt,1 − nt)=l n ( ct)+γ ln(mt/pt)+θln(1 − nt),
where γ and θ are positive constants that measure the relative importance of real money holdings
and leisure in utility.
The consumer’s optimization problem is subject to a no-Ponzi-game condition and to the se-














for all t,w h e r eτt is a lump-sum tax, πt = pt/pt−1 is the gross inﬂation rate, it−1 is the gross
nominal interest rate on government debt which is set in period t − 1 a n dp a i di np e r i o dt, wt is
the wage rate, and rt is the gross return on capital between periods t − 1 and t. In equilibrium,
the absence of arbitrage proﬁts will require rt to equal the real gross interest rate it−1/πt.
First-order necessary conditions for the representative consumer’s problem include:
1/ct = β(it/πt+1)(1/ct+1), (3)
mt/pt = γctit/(it − 1), (4)
Equation (3) is an Euler equation for consumption and equation (4) deﬁnes money demand as a
function of consumption and the return on money. We will see below that only these two conditions
2All results of the paper follow through if agents derive utility from government expenditures, as long as they
enter separably in the utility function.
4are necessary to derive the model’s implications for the aggregate price level, without reference to
the remaining ﬁrst-order conditions.
2.2 Government
In every period, the government spends an exogenous amount of resources Gt. Government expen-
ditures may be ﬁnanced by levying lump-sum taxes (τt), by issuing money (Mt), and by increasing
public debt (Bt). The government is subject to a no-Ponzi-game condition and to a dynamic budget
constraint (expressed in real terms):










































h=1 rt+h is the j-periods-ahead market discount factor, and Tt, St and Gt are
the present value of tax receipts, seigniorage revenue, and government expenditure, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the government’s present value budget constraint holds
with equality.3
The government is assumed to follow a “long-run” ﬁscal policy rule whereby it commits itself
to raise large enough primary surpluses (in present value terms) to back a constant fraction of the
currently outstanding debt. More formally:
Deﬁnition (The δ-backing Fiscal Policy): Given a sequence of prices {it+j−1,p t+j}
∞
j=0 and an
initial stock of nominal debt Bt−1,aδ-backing ﬁscal policy is a sequence {Gt+j,τt+j,B t+j}
∞
j=0 such
that, for all t:




where δ ∈ [0,1].
Put simply, this ﬁscal policy rule means that a constant fraction (δ) of the outstanding government
debt, including interest payments, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future
primary surpluses. Since the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is always satisﬁed, it
follows that:




3Note that we impose a no-Ponzi game condition on total government liabilities. Under the assumption that the






5Hence, the policy (6) also implies that a fraction (1−δ) of the currently outstanding debt is backed
by the present discounted value of current and future seigniorage revenue.
The set of possible ﬁscal regimes is indexed by the fraction δ of the outstanding debt that is
backed by the primary surplus. Because δ ∈ [0,1], this set is a continuum limited by the following
two polar cases:
(i) In the case where δ =1 ,t h eﬁscal authority backs fully all outstanding debt. It commits
itself to adjust the stream of future primary surpluses in order to match the current value of the
government’s bond obligations. There is complete accommodation of the ﬁscal policy to any open
market sale by the monetary authority. Whenever the monetary authority sells government bonds
in the open market, the ﬁscal authority increases current or future taxes (and/or reduces current
or future expenditures) to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt. On
the other hand, the monetary authority never responds to the increase in the stock of government
debt associated with a budget deﬁcit. Sargent (1982) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) refer to this
case as a Ricardian regime, while Leeper (1991) refers to it as one of active monetary/passive ﬁscal
policy. Here it will be called one of zero ﬁscal dominance and complete central bank independence.
(ii) In the case where δ =0 , all outstanding debt is backed by the monetary authority in the
form of current and future seigniorage revenues. The monetary authority fully accommodates the
ﬁscal authority whenever a budget deﬁcit is ﬁnanced with debt. This accommodation takes the
form of an increase in current or future seigniorage revenues to back the principal and interest
payments on the newly issued debt. The ﬁscal authority is insensitive to monetary policy in the
sense that neither taxes nor expenditure react (now or in the future) to changes in the stock of
outstanding government debt. Sargent, and Aiyagari and Gertler refer to this case as a polar Non-
Ricardian regime. Leeper calls it one of passive monetary/active ﬁscal policy. Here, this case will
be deﬁned as one of complete ﬁscal dominance.
The long-run rule (6) is consistent with multiple period-by-period ﬁscal policy rules. As an
example, consider the following version of the rule used by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985):
pt(τt − Gt)=δ [(it−1 − 1)Bt−1 − (Bt − Bt−1)]. (8)
Under (8), the nominal primary surplus is adjusted in every period (increasing τt or reducing Gt)
in the exact amount needed to ﬁnance a ﬁxed fraction δ of the interest on the outstanding debt
(Bt−1) net of an adjustment for debt growth. To see that this stationary policy satisﬁes (6), simply
iterate forward on (8) and use the government’s no-Ponzi-game condition. In principle, there might
be other period-by-period policy rules (perhaps not time-stationary) that are consistent with the
rule (6). An advantage of this approach is that it allows both the determination of the price level
and the construction of empirical estimates of δ using the long-run policy rule (6) without having to
assume that a particular policy like (8) is satisﬁed in every period, for every country in the sample.
6The parameter δ characterizes the degree of interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary au-
thorities. In the paper, it will be treated as a “deep parameter,” that reﬂects the revealed preferences
of governments regarding the backing of its debt either by the ﬁscal or the monetary authority.
This parameter should not be interpreted narrowly, as capturing a publicly announced policy com-
mitment, or a commitment formally written in a country’s budget, constitution, or central bank
organic law. Instead, δ is a value that arises from the interaction of the ﬁscal and monetary author-
ities given a stable institutional setup. This interpretation is reinforced by the observation that
the price level is derived here using a long-run ﬁscal policy rule without any reference to particular
period-by-period ﬁscal or monetary policy rules.
Our speciﬁcation of government behavior follows an earlier literature that describes monetary
and/or ﬁscal policies in terms of explicit rules. See, among others, Taylor (1993) and Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (2000) for monetary policy rules; and Sargent and Wallace (1981), Aiyagari and
Gertler (1985), Leeper (1991), and Bohn (1998) for ﬁscal policy rules. Leeper and Bohn point
out that ﬁscal rules relating taxes to debt can be consistent with an optimizing government that
minimizes the cost of tax collection by smoothing marginal tax rates over time [see Barro (1979)].
We view the δ-backing rule as a fairly unrestrictive way to parameterize government behavior that
is convenient both analytically and empirically. It captures in a reduced-form way the idea that
in response to diﬀerent institutional settings, the monetary authority will face diﬀerent obligations
regarding ﬁscal policy. Whether this rule satisﬁes some optimality criterion, or whether it is a
realistic description of government behavior beyond that just mentioned is an open question to be
addressed in future research.
2.3 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium for this economy may be deﬁn e di na ne n t i r e l ys t a n d a r dw a y .S p e c i f -
ically, it corresponds to a price system, allocations for the representative consumer and the rep-
resentative ﬁrm, and a government policy, such that (i) the representative consumer and the rep-
resentative ﬁrm optimize given the government policy and the price system, (ii) the government
policy is budget-feasible given the price system and the choices of consumers and ﬁrms, and (iii)
markets clear.
In this model, the price level is determined by the clearing of the money market
Mt = mt. (9)
Money supply is determined by the combination of the ﬁscal rule and the government’s intertem-
poral budget constraint [eq. (7)], while money demand is given by the consumer’s intratemporal
condition relating money and consumption [eq. (4)]. From equation (7), money supply can be

























Using the equilibrium condition (9) and money demand (4) in (10) yields























t )((it+j − 1)/it+j), in terms of current consumption, and after some
algebra:
pt =
(1 − β)(Mt−1 +( 1− δ)it−1Bt−1)
γct
. (11)
This equation describes the aggregate price level as a function of consumption and of the beginning-
of-period stocks of money and debt. Aiyagari and Gertler obtain an expression for the price level
similar to the one above, but assuming a speciﬁc period-by-period rule and focusing on a stationary
solution with constant asset prices.
As an alternative, one can use the fact that Mt−1 +(1−δ)it−1Bt−1 = Mt +(1−δ)Bt,4 to write
the price level in terms of the end-of-period stocks of money and debt:
pt =
(1 − β)[Mt +( 1− δ)Bt]
γct
. (12)
Note that equations (11) and (12) are equivalent, but the empirical analysis of (12) would not
require data on the gross nominal interest rate. Regardless of whether one focuses on (11) or
(12), this model implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the
proportion of the outstanding debt that is backed by money. In this sense, the proportion of the
outstanding debt that is backed by money behaves like money itself.
Notice that the derivation of the aggregate price level, pt, does not involve the production side of
the economy. In particular, it does not involve the consumer’s ﬁrst-order conditions for their choice
of capital and labor, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions, or the market clearing in goods and factors
markets. Since this model displays the property of money superneutrality, the production side of
the economy is solved in a completely independent set of equations that do not include nominal
4Write equation (7) as:
(Mt − Mt−1)/pt − (1 − δ)it−1Bt−1/pt = −St+1/rt+1,
= −(1 − δ)itBt/pt+1rt+1,
= −(1 − δ)Bt/pt,
where the last line follows from multiplying and dividing the right-hand side by pt, and using the deﬁnitions of gross
inﬂation and gross real interest rate.
8variables.5 The consumption level, ct, that appears in the denominator of (12) is determined in
that subsystem as well. Thus, pt is the outcome of monetary policy (reﬂected in the sequence of
Mt) and how government debt is backed (summarized by the parameter δ).6
In order to develop further the reader’s intuition, consider a long run situation where all real








where V ≡ (1 − β)y/(γc) can be interpreted as a measure of velocity of the broad monetary
aggregate, Mt +( 1− δ)Bt, that consists of the sum of money and the monetized debt (i.e., the
proportion of debt that is backed by seigniorage). Note that only for the special case where δ =1 ,
can the constant V be interpreted as money-velocity and the Quantity Theory of Money holds.
More generally, for any δ ∈ [0,1), the stock of debt plays a role in the determination of the price
level. This point was made before by Aiyagari and Gertler.
Government debt also plays a crucial role in the determination of pt under the Fiscal Theory
of the Price Level (FTPL). The FTPL assumes that the government does not have to satisfy its
intertemporal budget constraint for all possible sequences of pt. Any particular path for the price
level that does not satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint could be automatically excluded as
an equilibrium by the government because it would not satisfy market clearing nor the consumer’s
optimality conditions. As a result of this assumption, pt is determined as the quotient between
the nominal value of interest-bearing debt and the present value of the all government revenues
(including seigniorage) regardless of whether the government debt is, or will be, monetized. In
contrast, in the model used here, the no-Ponzi-game condition on the government’s behavior implies
an intertemporal budget constraint that is satisﬁed for all price sequences and the equilibrium
sequence is determined by the clearing of the money market.
This conceptual diﬀerence between the FTPL and this model has both theoretical and empirical
implications. At the theoretical level it implies that, under the FTPL, Bt aﬀects the price level
even if it is never monetized, while in this model, only the proportion that is monetized (now or
in the future) will aﬀect pt.T h ee ﬀect of Bt on pt increases linearly with the proportion of debt
that is backed by current or future seigniorage revenues, (1 − δ).W h e n δ =1 ,g i v e nt h ep a t h
of government expenditures, savings in the form of government debt will be used to pay future
taxes. Consequently, debt has no eﬀect on the current demand for goods or money and Ricardian
5In general, the Sidrauski model can exhibit nonsuperneutrality outside the steady state. Fischer (1979) shows
that for the CRRA utility function, the rate of capital accumulation is positively related to the rate of money growth,
except for the case of log-separable utility used here.
6Results are also robust to allowing distortionary taxation on capital and labor. The reason is that the Euler
equation (3) and the intratemporal condition (4) are unchanged when the model is generalized in this manner. All
that is required to make our results go through is to redeﬁne Tt as the present discounted value of all lump-sum and
distortionary taxes on capital and labor income.
9equivalence holds. When δ ∈ [0,1), a proportion of debt does not require future tax increases but
implies an increase in current and/or future seigniorage revenue. Anticipating future inﬂation,
forward-looking agents reduce their current money demand and bid the price level up today.
At the empirical level, the next section will show that under certain conditions, the long-
run dynamics of money, debt, and private consumption permit the econometric estimation of δ
in our model. Statistical inference can then be used to draw conclusions regarding the policy
regime (whether Ricardian or not) in a given economy. However, given the assumption that the
intertemporal budget constraint is always satisﬁed, the econometric results have no direct bearing
on the impossibility result in Cochrane (1998), whereby the FTPL cannot be falsiﬁed empirically
because only equilibrium prices are observable.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Econometric Strategy
This section describes a simple econometric strategy to obtain estimates of the parameter that





Ct − (1 − δ)Bt, (13)
where Ct ≡ ptct denotes nominal private consumption. Consider the empirical counterpart to this
relation:
Mt = α0 + α1Ct + α2Bt + et, (14)
where α0 is an intercept, αj for j =1 ,2 are constant coeﬃcients, and et is a disturbance term that
captures speciﬁcation error. In terms of the structural parameters of the model, α1 = γ/(1 − β),
and α2 = −(1 − δ). Although not all structural parameters can be identiﬁed from the ordinary
least squares (OLS) projection of Mt on Ct and Bt, δ would be identiﬁed from the coeﬃcient on
the stock of debt.
In principle, because all three variables are endogenous to the model, the OLS regression would
yield biased and inconsistent estimates if the variables were covariance-stationary. However, if
Mt,C t, and Bt are nonstationary variables, and equation (13) is a cointegrating relationship, then
the same regression would yield superconsistent parameter estimates (Phillips and Durlauf 1986).7
This approach is not the only one that could deliver estimates of the parameter δ. There are at
least two other strategies. First, one could consider estimating δ directly from the ﬁscal rule (6).
7In principle, the reduced-form (14) may be written with either Mt,C t, or Bt on the left-hand side. In adopting
the formulation above, we are normalizing the coeﬃcient of Mt in the cointegrating vector to unity. Provided Mt
belongs to the cointegrating relation, results are robust to this normalization. The reason we choose to write the
reduced-form in this manner is that its estimation delivers δ directly without the need to use, for example, the Delta
method to compute its standard error.
10An advantage of this strategy is that it would deliver a “theory-free” estimate without the need to
model the consumer’s behavior or make assumptions about functional forms. Unfortunately, this
strategy requires the computation of the present discounted values Tt and Gt that involve inﬁnite
future values for taxes and government expenditure. Since the econometrician only has access
to a ﬁnite number of observations, the implementation of this approach would necessarily involve
truncation and the loss of many degrees of freedom.
Second, one could follow the literature and construct inferences about government behavior on
the basis of particular period-by-period rules [see, for example, Bohn (1998)]. This strategy would
overcome the problem created by the computation of inﬁnite summations. However, it seems
unlikely that the same period-by-period rule describes government behavior in a cross-section of
countries with diﬀerent institutional arrangements. Instead, the approach here makes the hypoth-
esis of similar consumer preferences across countries (at least in terms of functional form if not of
preference parameters) but avoids imposing a common period-by-period institutional framework
for governments in diﬀerent countries.
Notice that it is possible to identify δ even if the theoretical model only assumes a long-run ﬁscal
policy rule, allowing any period-by-period rule that satisﬁes (6). The reason is that current money
supply is derived directly from the implication of the long-run ﬁscal rule and the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint. Then, the money market equilibrium and the agents’ ﬁrst-order
conditions are used to derive the price level. Thus, there is a sense in which the long-run rule
is directly estimated, using the restrictions from economic theory to solve out the inﬁnite sum.8
Hence, by developing a fully-speciﬁed model, we can construct econometric inferences about the
policy regime, even if we do not know the particular period-by-period rule followed by a given
government in a given country.
3.2 Data
The empirical analysis is based on annual, nominal (in local currency), per-capita data on mon-
etary base, government debt, and private consumption from 18 industrialized countries, all mem-
bers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 20 developing
economies. We included all IMF member countries for which reasonably long time series of the
variables were available. In addition to data availability, the sample period for some countries was
limited by substantial institutional changes. In particular, the sample for Germany ends before the
reuniﬁcation and the samples for member countries of the European Monetary Union end before
the introduction of the Euro, in January 1999. Table 1 shows the cross-country sample used in the
8Recall that we used the money market equilibrium to substitute M’s (money supply) with m’s (money demand)
in (10). Then, we used the agents’ intratemporal condition (4) to express the inﬁnite sum in terms of future
consumption and, ﬁnally, we used consumption smoothing to write the inﬁnite consumption sum in terms of current
consumption alone.
11empirical analysis.9
All series come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database compiled by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, with the exception of government debt for the United States, Canada
and Brazil, which come from national sources.10 For all other countries, government debt corre-
sponds to the IFS series 88 (Total Debt), or the sum of IFS series 88a or 88b (Domestic Debt)
with IFS series 89a or 89b (Foreign Debt). Monetary base corresponds to IFS series 14 (Reserve
Money) or to the sum of IFS series 14a, 14c, and 14d, which are disaggregated liabilities of the
monetary authority. Private consumption corresponds to the series 96F (Household Consumption
Expenditures or Private Consumption). Population is IFS series 99Z..ZF (mid-year estimate of the




countries Sample countries Sample
Australia 1949 − 2002 Brazil 1964 − 2005
Austria 1970 − 1997 Colombia 1950 − 1987
Belgium 1953 − 1998 Costa Rica 1951 − 2002
Canada 1948 − 2005 El Salvador 1951 − 2000
Finland 1950 − 1997 Guyana 1955 − 1997
France 1951 − 1998 Honduras 1954 − 2004
Germany 1950 − 1990 India 1960 − 2001
Iceland 1950 − 2005 Indonesia 1972 − 2001
Italy 1962 − 1998 Israel 1972 − 2001
Luxembourg 1974 − 1997 South Korea 1953 − 1998
Netherlands 1951 − 1998 Malaysia 1960 − 1999
New Zealand 1970 − 2000 Malta 1960 − 2001
Norway 1971 − 2003 Mexico 1965 − 2005
Spain 1962 − 1998 Nigeria 1968 − 2004
Sweden 1950 − 2005 Morocco 1962 − 2005
Switzerland 1960 − 2004 Pakistan 1960 − 2003
United Kingdom 1970 − 1997 Philippines 1949 − 1994
United States 1948 − 2005 South Africa 1956 − 2005
Thailand 1950 − 2005
Tunisia 1971 − 1999
9We acknowledge the fact that data from member countries of the OECD may diﬀer, in terms of quality and
reliability, from data from developing economies. We also point out that OECD countries are market economies
with relatively few prices under direct or indirect government control, which is not always the case for developing
economies (for example, Argentina, Brazil, and Israel used widespread price and wage controls during inﬂation
stabilization programs in the 1980s). These factors must be taken into account in the interpretation of results.
10For the United States, government debt is the Gross Federal Debt Held by the Public from the U.S. Department
of Commerce, available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (www.stls.frb.org). For Canada, it corresponds
to the series D469409 (Net Federal Government Debt) in the CANSIM database of Statistics Canada, and for Brazil,
it is represented by the series BM_DPIPP (end-of-period outsanding federal debt not held by the central bank),
available from the Banco Central do Brasil
123.3 Results
The econometric strategy outlined in the previous section is valid only if Mt,C t, and Bt are nonsta-
tionary variables and the OLS regression (14) is not spurious, but forms a cointegrating relationship.
Unit-root and cointegration tests are used to assess both conditions.
Country lags t-stat p-value lags t-stat p-value lags t-stat p-value
OECD countries:
Australia 1 -0.14 0.99 6 0.07 1.00 9 -1.64 0.76
Austria 0 -2.60 0.28 2 -1.69 0.73 2 -1.63 0.75
Belgium 1 -1.99 0.59 8 -1.06 0.92 1 -2.40 0.37
Canada 1 -0.89 0.95 1 -1.81 0.69 1 -2.68 0.25
Finland 7 0.61 1.00 9 -0.22 0.99 2 -0.69 0.97
France 1 -2.18 0.49 0 -1.74 0.09 1 0.94 1.00
Germany 5 0.32 1.00 1 0.18 1.00 3 0.81 1.00
Iceland 2 1.28 1.00 9 -1.19 0.90 5 -2.36 0.40
Italy 0 -1.48 0.82 1 -0.50 0.98 3 -0.44 0.98
Luxembourg 0 -2.49 0.33 1 -2.01 0.56 0 -0.63 0.97
Netherlands 1 -1.17 0.91 8 -0.24 0.99 1 -1.72 0.72
New Zealand 0 -2.37 0.39 0 -4.07 0.02 0 0.20 1.00
Norway 2 -1.06 0.92 2 0.05 1.00 0 -0.08 0.99
Spain 7 -0.91 0.94 1 -2.04 0.56 9 0.36 1.00
Sweden 3 -1.84 0.67 2 -2.19 0.48 8 -1.39 0.85
Switzerland 4 -2.50 0.33 1 -1.45 0.83 7 -0.09 0.99
United Kingdom 4 -1.64 0.74 0 -1.47 0.82 0 0.58 1.00
United States 9 -0.08 0.99 2 1.27 1.00 7 -1.19 0.90
Developing countries:
Brazil 2 -0.25 0.99 1 0.40 1.00 2 1.14 1.00
Colombia 1 1.18 1.00 1 2.16 1.00 0 23.89 1.00
Costa Rica 3 0.49 1.00 1 -1.78 0.70 8 0.21 1.00
El Salvador 2 -0.85 0.95 0 -2.56 0.30 7 0.05 1.00
Guyana 1 0.91 1.00 0 1.12 1.00 5 0.38 1.00
Honduras 4 0.02 1.00 10 0.05 1.00 0 1.79 1.00
India 0 3.55 1.00 5 0.05 1.00 0 10.84 1.00
Indonesia 0 2.14 1.00 1 -0.71 0.96 2 -0.28 0.99
Israel 2 -2.44 0.35 0 -1.41 0.84 0 -2.49 0.33
Korea 0 0.65 1.00 8 0.28 1.00 1 1.96 1.00
Malaysia 9 -0.26 0.99 3 -0.29 0.99 1 -2.56 0.30
Malta 0 0.34 1.00 0 -1.82 0.68 1 0.66 1.00
Mexico 1 0.05 1.00 0 4.40 1.00 6 0.64 1.00
Morocco 1 -2.64 0.26 0 1.71 1.00 0 -1.76 0.71
Nigeria 4 1.97 1.00 2 0.97 1.00 9 0.22 1.00
Pakistan 5 0.23 1.00 4 1.46 1.00 4 0.08 1.00
Philippines 1 2.52 1.00 2 0.57 1.00 0 1.30 1.00
South Africa 5 1.64 1.00 10 -0.03 0.99 2 -0.85 0.95
Thailand 2 1.00 1.00 6 0.05 1.00 10 -0.15 0.99
Tunisia 0 0.94 1.00 1 -0.70 0.96 2 0.10 1.00
Notes:
(1) ADF Test equations include a constant and a linear trend.
(2) Number of lags selected according to the Modified Akaike Information Criteria.
Table 2
ADF Unit Root Test on C t, M t, and  B t
C t M t B t
13Table 2 report results of augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests. For all ADF tests,
the estimated alternative is a covariance-stationary autoregression with both a constant and a de-
terministic trend. The level of augmentation in the tests (i.e., the number of lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences
included in the OLS regression) is based on the Modiﬁed Information Criterion (MIC) proposed by
Ng and Perron (2001).11 Note that, for all countries, the null hypothesis of a unit root with drift
cannot be rejected against the alternative of a deterministic trend at the ﬁve per cent signiﬁcance
level. The only exception is the per-capita nominal money stock of New Zealand.12
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested using the residual-based method proposed by
Engle and Granger (1987) and Phillips and Ouliaris (1990). Gonzalo and Lee (1998) show that
this test is more robust than Johansen’s trace test to certain departures from unit root behavior
like long memory and stochastic unit roots. The residual-based test requires running OLS on the
relation of interest and then testing the hypothesis that the regression residuals have a unit root.
Nonstationarity of the residuals constitutes evidence against cointegration. For some countries, the
test results, reported in Table 3, depend on the method used to select the level of augmentation.
Four diﬀerent criteria are considered: sequential t-tests, Modiﬁed Akaike (MAIC), Modiﬁed Schwarz
(MSIC), and a standard Schwarz information criteria.
Note that, for the OECD countries, rejection of no cointegration at the 15 per cent signiﬁcance
level or less is the common outcome from tests based on sequential t-tests and Schwarz lag-selection
methods. For Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Norway, tests based on MAIC and
MSIC lag-selection methods suggest no cointegration. The null of no cointegration is also not
rejected for Canada, when considering sequential t-tests and MAIC.
Among developing countries, on the other hand, there is strong evidence of no cointegration
for Nigeria, Pakistan, and Thailand with the null hypothesis not being reject even at the 65 per
cent level, regardless of the lag-selection method. For all other countries, the null hypothesis of no
cointegration is not rejected at the 15 per cent level or less, for at least two lag-selection methods.
The exception is South Korea, for which only the test based on MSIC lag-selection method shows
evidence of cointegration.
Based on these results, it is reasonable to conclude that there is cointegration between nonsta-
tionary variables Mt,B t, and Ct in all OECD countries, except New Zealand (since Mt is found to
be stationary), and in all developing countries, except South Korea (weak evidence of no cointegra-
tion), and Nigeria, Pakistan, and Thailand (strong evidence against cointegration). For all other
countries, the tests show evidence that 1) Mt,B t, and Ct are nonstationary and, 2) for at least two
diﬀerent lag-selection methods, those variables form a cointegration relationship.
11For robustness to the lag-selection method, we also applied recursive t-tests with similar conclusions.
12Results (available from the author upon request) are robust to alternative unit root tests such as the KPSS
test (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin 1992), the ADF test with GLS detrending, the ERS point-optimal
test (Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock 1996), the Phillips-Perron test (Phillips and Perron 1988), and the Ng-Perron
modiﬁed unit root test (Ng and Perron 2001).
14Country lags t-stat p-value lags t-stat p-value lags t-stat p-value lags t-stat p-value
OECD countries:
Australia 7 -1.49 0.13 7 -1.49 0.13 7 -1.49 0.13 0 -6.28 0.00
Austria 0 -4.77 0.00 0 -4.77 0.00 0 -4.77 0.00 0 -4.77 0.00
Belgium 8 -2.28 0.02 0 -3.50 0.00 0 -3.50 0.00 0 -3.50 0.00
Canada 10 -1.15 0.23 10 -1.15 0.23 1 -2.12 0.03 0 -2.93 0.00
Finland 7 -3.41 0.00 4 -1.28 0.18 4 -1.28 0.18 10 -4.40 0.00
France 2 -3.37 0.00 0 -1.59 0.10 0 -1.59 0.10 2 -3.37 0.00
Germany 9 -4.49 0.00 0 -1.10 0.24 0 -1.10 0.24 1 -2.43 0.02
Iceland 7 -2.25 0.03 9 -1.33 0.17 6 -1.32 0.17 7 -2.25 0.03
Italy 3 -3.51 0.00 1 -0.41 0.53 1 -0.41 0.53 3 -3.51 0.00
Luxembourg 1 -1.87 0.06 0 -0.90 0.31 0 -0.90 0.31 1 -1.87 0.06
Netherlands 8 -2.19 0.03 0 -4.41 0.00 0 -4.41 0.00 8 -2.19 0.03
New Zealand 0 -4.73 0.00 0 -4.73 0.00 0 -4.73 0.00 3 -1.83 0.06
Norway 9 -2.88 0.01 2 -0.77 0.37 2 -0.77 0.37 0 -4.73 0.00
Spain 0 -2.84 0.01 0 -2.84 0.01 0 -2.84 0.01 0 -2.84 0.01
Sweden 7 -3.24 0.00 2 -2.13 0.03 2 -2.13 0.03 0 -2.13 0.03
Switzerland 0 -1.87 0.06 0 -1.87 0.06 0 -1.87 0.06 0 -1.87 0.06
United Kingdom 3 -3.07 0.00 0 -2.56 0.01 0 -2.56 0.01 0 -2.56 0.01
United States 1 -2.16 0.03 3 -1.39 0.15 3 -1.39 0.15 1 -2.16 0.03
Developing countries:
Brazil 8 -1.66 0.09 0 -4.38 0.00 0 -4.38 0.00 8 -1.66 0.09
Colombia 9 -1.47 0.13 6 -0.19 0.61 6 -0.19 0.61 9 -1.47 0.13
Costa Rica 10 -6.64 0.00 0 -5.29 0.00 0 -5.29 0.00 10 -6.64 0.00
El Salvador 7 -1.25 0.19 7 -1.25 0.19 1 -1.98 0.05 0 -2.53 0.01
Guyana 7 -3.82 0.00 9 -0.66 0.42 4 -1.46 0.13 7 -3.82 0.00
Honduras 10 -2.09 0.04 6 -1.22 0.20 6 -1.22 0.20 10 -2.09 0.04
India 9 -2.15 0.03 7 -0.89 0.32 7 -0.89 0.32 0 -3.56 0.00
Indonesia 3 -3.14 0.00 0 -1.85 0.06 0 -1.85 0.06 3 -3.14 0.00
Israel 1 -2.98 0.00 0 -2.14 0.03 0 -2.14 0.03 1 -2.98 0.00
Korea 8 -0.97 0.29 9 -0.67 0.42 0 -2.87 0.01 8 -0.97 0.29
Malaysia 5 -2.13 0.03 4 -1.22 0.20 4 -1.22 0.20 5 -2.13 0.03
Malta 0 -3.34 0.00 0 -3.34 0.00 0 -3.34 0.00 0 -3.34 0.00
Mexico 9 -4.04 0.00 0 -2.38 0.02 0 -2.38 0.02 9 -4.04 0.00
Morocco 2 -1.41 0.15 1 -0.59 0.46 1 -0.59 0.46 0 -1.51 0.12
Nigeria 9 0.02 0.68 9 0.02 0.68 9 0.02 0.68 9 0.02 0.68
Pakistan 9 0.66 0.85 7 -0.33 0.56 7 -0.33 0.56 9 0.66 0.85
Philippines 0 -3.15 0.00 0 -3.15 0.00 0 -3.15 0.00 0 -3.15 0.00
South Africa 0 -5.15 0.00 9 -1.13 0.23 8 -1.26 0.19 0 -5.15 0.00
Thailand 7 0.65 0.85 6 0.05 0.69 6 0.05 0.69 7 0.65 0.85
Tunisia 7 -2.26 0.03 2 -1.39 0.15 2 -1.39 0.15 0 -4.40 0.00
Note: ADF Test equations do not include either constant or trend.
seq. t-tests MAIC MSIC Schwarz
Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests
Lag Length Selection Criteria
Table 3
A common dilemma related to the use of the unit-root and cointegration tests has been their
low power when applied to time series only available for the postwar period, since it is the span
15of the data, rather than the frequency, that maters for the power of these tests (Perron,1989,
1991; Pierse and Snell 1995). In the hope that inference about the existence of unit roots and
cointegration can be made more straightforward and precise by combining information on the time
series dimension with that from the cross-sectional dimension, a number of unit root tests using
panel data techniques have been suggested (Banerjee 1999; Baltagi and Kao 2000).
Method stat p-value stat p-value stat p-value
All countries:
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 6.02 1.00 13.67 1.00 16.49 1.00
Breitung t-stat 14.28 1.00 10.90 1.00 10.62 1.00
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  13.24 1.00 12.41 1.00 17.71 1.00
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 18.52 1.00 12.56 1.00 28.90 1.00
PP - Fisher Chi-square 19.71 1.00 35.82 1.00 27.68 1.00
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat 12.99 0.00 7.13 0.00 12.04 0.00
OECD countries:
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.18 0.43 4.48 1.00 0.20 0.58
Breitung t-stat 11.89 1.00 8.49 1.00 5.24 1.00
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  4.44 1.00 4.84 1.00 6.66 1.00
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 13.77 1.00 14.36 1.00 8.82 1.00
PP - Fisher Chi-square 14.21 1.00 37.01 0.42 6.50 1.00
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat 13.10 0.00 5.55 0.00 12.71 0.00
Developing countries:
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 10.58 1.00 13.42 1.00 24.10 1.00
Breitung t-stat 13.04 1.00 12.00 1.00 13.61 1.00
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  14.17 1.00 14.22 1.00 20.29 1.00
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 4.92 1.00 4.39 1.00 5.42 1.00
PP - Fisher Chi-square 3.40 1.00 8.55 1.00 8.28 1.00
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat 13.96 0.00 11.84 0.00 11.18 0.00
Note: Tests include individual fixed effects and individual linear trends.
Table 4
Panel Unit Root Tests
C t M t B t
16Tables 4, shows the results from six diﬀerent panel unit root tests13 applied to the whole cross-
country sample and to subsamples of OECD and developing countries. All tests include a linear
trend and individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The general conclusions for nonstationarity in Mt,B t, and Ct
are strongly conﬁrmed in all tests.
To test for cointegration between Mt,B t, and Ct in a heterogeneous panel framework, Pedroni’s
panel cointegration test (Pedroni 1999, 2004) is used. Two sets of statistics are considered: 1)
four statistics pooled along the “within-dimension” (the panel cointegration statistics), constructed
by summing both the denominator and the numerator terms over the cross-section dimension
separately, and 2) three statistics based on pooling along the “between-dimension” (the group
mean cointegration statistics), constructed by ﬁrst dividing the numerator by the denominator and
then summing over the cross-sectional dimension. That is, the former are based on estimators that
pool the autoregressive coeﬃcient, say ρi,a c r o s sd i ﬀerent cross-section members i =1 ,...,N,f o r
the unit root tests on the estimated residuals, while the latter are based on simple averages of the
individually estimated ρi’s. As a consequence, the null hypothesis H0 : ρi =1for all i, is tested
against the alternative H1 : ρi = ρ<1 for all i (common value for the autoregreesive coeﬃcient on
the residuals), in the case of the panel statistics, and against H1 : ρi < 1 for all i,i nt h ec a s eo f
group mean statistics. Results, displayed in Table 5, strongly suggest the rejection of the null, in
favor of cointegration.
Statistic stat p-value stat p-value stat p-value
panel v-stat 7.9625 0.0000 7.9625 0.0000 7.1886 0.0000
panel ρ-stat -8.4855 0.0000 -6.1984 0.0000 -5.6833 0.0000
panel pp-stat  -7.5782 0.0000 -5.6172 0.0000 -5.0295 0.0000
panel adf-stat    -5.4165 0.0000 -3.6561 0.0001 -4.1159 0.0000
group ρ-stat   -7.2915 0.0000 -5.3058 0.0000 -5.0171 0.0000
group pp-stat  -7.8870 0.0000 -5.4015 0.0000 -5.7471 0.0000
group adf-stat   -6.0431 0.0000 -3.1040 0.0010 -5.3851 0.0000
Developing countries
Table 5
Pedroni's Panel Cointegration Test
All countries OECD countries
These results, both from time series and panel frameworks, are important because they allow
an empirical description of the money market equilibrium as a cointegrating relationship for most
countries in the sample. This means that even if the individual series can be represented as
nonstationary processes, the behavioral rules and constraints of the model economy imply that a
precise combination of these variables should be stationary. Hence, a simple Least Squares regression
yields a superconsistent estimate of the parameter that characterizes the interdependence between
13For the ADF and PP Fisher-type tests, see Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). For the other tests, see
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), and Hadri (1999).
17ﬁscal and monetary policies.14
For the estimation of the cointegrating vector, we employ the dynamic ordinary least squares
(DOLS) method proposed by Stock and Watson (1993). This method is asymptotically equivalent to
maximum likelihood but exploits the functional relationship predicted by the model. This approach
involves running the OLS regression:






ξ2,s∆Bt−s + et, (15)
where ξj,s for j =1 ,2 and s = −p,−p +1 ,...,q− 1,q are constant coeﬃcients. The appropriate
number of leads and lags was selected using the Modiﬁed Akaike Information Criteria.
Table 6 presents estimates of the structural parameters. Nigeria, Pakistan, and Thailand are
excluded from the sample, since no evidence of cointegration was found for those countries. How-
ever, South Korea is included even though evidence of cointegration is weak, and New Zealand
stays on the sample on the basis of an Ng−Perron modiﬁed unit root test (Ng and Perron 2001)
that does not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root on Mt at the ten per cent
signiﬁcance level, or less. Needless to say, estimates for these two countries should be regarded with
more caution.
In Table 6, the p-values for b α1and b α2,a n dt h ec o n ﬁdence interval for b δ are based on rescaled
standard errors. Standard errors are rescaled to take into account the serial correlation of the
residuals that remains after adding the p leads and q lags (see, Hayashi 2000, pp. 654−657). Notice
that, although the weight of real balances in the utility function (γ) and the subjective discount rate
(β) are not separately identiﬁed, the coeﬃcient on nominal consumption, α1 = γ/(1−β) should be
positive. Among the developed economies, except for Iceland and Luxembourg, b α1 is positive and
statistically diﬀerent from zero. In the developing countries subsample, the exceptions are Israel,
Philippines, and Tunisia, for which b α1 is not statistically signiﬁcant at the ten per cent level.15
Estimates of δ are identiﬁed from the reduced-form parameter α2 = −(1−δ). These estimates, b δ,
are reported in Column 8 of Table 6. In all cases, this parameter is positive, and with the exception
of Costa Rica and Malta, statistically diﬀerent from zero. At a ﬁrst glance, the two groups of
countries do not seem to be much diﬀerence regarding the degree of ﬁscal dominance: given the
95 per cent conﬁdence intervals, in 6 out of 18 OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy,
New Zealand, and the United States) and in 7 out of 17 developing countries (Brazil, Costa Rica,
South Korea, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, and South Africa), we cannot reject the null hypothesis
14Elliot (1998) shows that even if the model variables have roots near but not exactly equal to one, the point
estimates of the cointegrating vector are consistent. However, hypothesis tests regarding the coeﬃcients that do not
have an exact unit root can be subject to size distortions.
15All regressions include the intercept term (not reported), α0. The theoretical model predicts that the intercept
should be zero [see eq. (13)]. However, for some countries in the sample, the intercept was found to be statistically
diﬀerent from zero. Strictly speaking, this constitutes a rejection of the theory. A more constructive interpretation
of this result is that the theoretical relation holds up to a constant term.
18that b δ<1.
leads lags
pq estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate start end obs
OECD countries:
Australia 0 0 0.060 0.0000 0.163 0.0002 1.163 [ 1.081 , 1.245 ] 1950 2002 53
Austria 0 1 0.178 0.0000 -0.035 0.0228 0.965 [ 0.936 , 0.995 ] 1972 1997 26
Belgium 1 3 0.180 0.0000 -0.044 0.0000 0.956 [ 0.949 , 0.963 ] 1957 1997 41
Canada 1 1 0.042 0.0000 0.013 0.0032 1.013 [ 1.005 , 1.022 ] 1950 2004 55
Finland 1 1 0.182 0.0000 -0.006 0.4967 0.994 [ 0.974 , 1.013 ] 1952 1997 46
France 2 1 0.152 0.0000 -0.070 0.0003 0.930 [ 0.895 , 0.965 ] 1953 1996 44
Germany 1 0 0.162 0.0000 0.009 0.8147 1.009 [ 0.935 , 1.082 ] 1951 1989 39
Iceland 3 2 -0.002 0.9453 0.092 0.0704 1.092 [ 0.992 , 1.193 ] 1953 2002 50
Italy 1 1 0.489 0.0000 -0.140 0.0000 0.860 [ 0.801 , 0.919 ] 1964 1997 34
Luxembourg 0 1 -0.028 0.0163 -0.142 0.4464 0.858 [ 0.471 , 1.245 ] 1976 1997 22
Netherlands 2 1 0.067 0.0572 0.077 0.0003 1.077 [ 1.039 , 1.115 ] 1953 1996 44
New Zealand 0 1 0.055 0.0000 -0.030 0.0165 0.970 [ 0.945 , 0.994 ] 1972 2000 29
Norway 0 0 0.115 0.0000 -0.021 0.3374 0.979 [ 0.935 , 1.023 ] 1972 2003 32
Spain 0 1 0.220 0.0157 -0.072 0.3084 0.928 [ 0.787 , 1.070 ] 1964 1998 35
Sweden 1 1 0.070 0.0037 0.012 0.4995 1.012 [ 0.976 , 1.048 ] 1952 2004 53
Switzerland 2 1 0.129 0.0004 -0.040 0.5324 0.960 [ 0.831 , 1.089 ] 1962 2002 41
United Kingdom 0 1 0.052 0.0000 -0.019 0.1372 0.981 [ 0.956 , 1.007 ] 1972 1997 26
United States 2 1 0.122 0.0000 -0.032 0.0003 0.968 [ 0.952 , 0.984 ] 1950 2003 54
Developing countries:
Brazil 1 3 0.399 0.0000 -0.053 0.0000 0.947 [ 0.935 , 0.960 ] 1968 2004 37
Colombia 1 1 0.233 0.0000 -0.422 0.0514 0.578 [ 0.153 , 1.003 ] 1952 1986 35
Costa Rica 1 1 0.611 0.0000 -0.762 0.0000 0.238 [ -0.066 , 0.543 ] 1953 2001 49
El Salvador 1 1 0.018 0.0000 0.004 0.7558 1.004 [ 0.978 , 1.030 ] 1953 1999 47
Guyana 1 1 0.334 0.0118 -0.015 0.0965 0.985 [ 0.968 , 1.003 ] 1957 1996 40
Honduras 5 1 0.156 0.0010 -0.023 0.6407 0.977 [ 0.876 , 1.077 ] 1956 1999 44
India 0 1 0.137 0.0026 0.075 0.0975 1.075 [ 0.986 , 1.164 ] 1962 2001 40
Indonesia 0 1 0.160 0.0000 0.084 0.0334 1.084 [ 1.007 , 1.160 ] 1974 2001 28
Israel 0 0 0.107 0.5206 0.104 0.3106 1.104 [ 0.897 , 1.310 ] 1973 2001 29
South Korea 1 1 0.197 0.0000 -0.358 0.0174 0.642 [ 0.351 , 0.933 ] 1955 1997 43
Malaysia 1 1 0.695 0.0000 -0.145 0.0962 0.855 [ 0.681 , 1.028 ] 1962 1998 37
Malta 1 0 1.386 0.0000 -0.908 0.0000 0.092 [ -0.037 , 0.222 ] 1961 2000 40
Mexico 1 0 0.168 0.0000 -0.200 0.0304 0.800 [ 0.619 , 0.980 ] 1966 2004 39
Morocco 1 1 0.599 0.0000 -0.192 0.0000 0.808 [ 0.760 , 0.856 ] 1964 2004 41
Philippines 1 1 0.082 0.1501 -0.083 0.3929 0.917 [ 0.715 , 1.120 ] 1953 1988 36
South Africa 1 1 0.120 0.0000 -0.056 0.0000 0.944 [ 0.922 , 0.965 ] 1958 2004 47
Tunisia 1 0 0.060 0.2549 0.070 0.1242 1.070 [ 0.979 , 1.162 ] 1972 1998 27
Notes:
(1) Individual DOLS equations include a constant.




DOLS Estimation of Structural Parameters
α1 α2 Valid Sample
However, note that the point estimate of δ is frequently closer to 1 among OECD countries
than within the developing countries subsample. There are only two OECD countries (Italy, and
Luxembourg) for which b δ is lower than 0.9,a so p p o s e dt o7 developing countries (Colombia, Costa
Rica, South Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, and Morocco). As previously mentioned, we cannot
19even reject the hypothesis that b δ =0for Costa Rica and Malta.16 For the two groups of countries,
Table 7 shows averages of both the estimated b δ and the 95 per cent conﬁdence lower bound, δL.
Notice that the average b δ and b δL are higher in the OECD countries subsample, and the diﬀerences
with respect to the developing countries are highly signiﬁcant.
OECD Developing t-stat p-value
mean δ 0.984 0.831 10.2918 0.0000
mean δ L 0.914 0.690 8.9805 0.0000
No. obs 18 17
Tests of Equality of Means
Table 7
Regarding the structural parameters of the model, another strategy to assess the diﬀerences
between OECD and developing countries is the use of heterogeneous panel estimation of long-run
relationships (Pesaram and Smith 1995). Table 8 shows the results of three diﬀerent ﬁxed-eﬀects
panel data estimations of equation (15). In the estimation of model 1, coeﬃcients α1 and α2
are both assumed to be common along the cross-section of countries. In model 2, they are both
assumed to be country-speciﬁc. In model 3, α1is common along the cross-sectional dimension, but
α2 is country-speciﬁc. Notice that country-speciﬁc estimates of α2, both from models 2 and 3, imply
higher values of δ for OECD countries in comparison with developing economies. In addition, in
both models 2 and 3, at the ﬁve per cent level, we cannot reject the hypothesis that δ (OECD)=1 ,
but we can reject the hypothesis that δ (developing) ≥ 1. As shown in Table 9, in both models 2
and 3, we can strongly reject the null hypothesis δ (OECD)=δ (developing) using a Wald test.
country estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate
model 1: all 0.090 0.0000 -0.002 0.4955 0.998 [ 0.990 , 1.005 ]
model 2: OECD 0.085 0.0000 -0.004 0.3425 0.996 [ 0.989 , 1.004 ]
developing 0.126 0.0000 -0.079 0.0000 0.921 [ 0.904 , 0.938 ]
model 3: all 0.096 0.0000
OECD -0.008 0.0365 0.992 [ 0.982 , 1.003 ]
developing -0.025 0.0000 0.975 [ 0.963 , 0.987 ]
95% conf. interval
Table 8
Panel DOLS Estimation of Structural Parameters
α1 α2 δ
16The theoretical model implies that δ is bounded between zero and one. Rather than incorporating a nonlinear
restriction in a linear estimation framework, we follow the simpler approach of ﬁrst estimating the cointegrating vector
a n dt h e nv e r i f y i n gw h e t h e rˆ δ falls in the [0,1] range. This is not the case for Australia, Canada, Germany, Iceland,
Netherlands, and Sweden, among OECD countries, and El salvador, India, Indonesia, and Tunisia, in the developing
countries’ subsample. However, for those countries, except for Australia, Canada (marginaly), Netherlands, and
Indonesia, the hypothesis that its true value is 1 cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent level.
20model 2:
Statistic Value   df     p-value
F-stat 24.5 (1, 1294)   0.0000
χ
2 24.5 1.000 0.0000
model 3:
Statistic Value   df     p-value





H 0:  δ(OECD) = δ (developing)
Table 9
Recall that δ is the proportion of current government debt that is backed by the present dis-
counted value of current and future primary surpluses. Hence, ﬁnding that δ is more likely to be
closer to 1 in the OECD subsample means that outstanding debt in developed economies is essen-
tially backed by the ﬁscal authority. Backing takes the form of a commitment to adjust the stream
of future primary surpluses to match the current value of its bond obligations. In the long-run,
there is complete accommodation of ﬁscal policy to the open market operations by the monetary
authority. For example, when the monetary authority sells government bonds, the ﬁscal author-
ity increases current or future taxes, and/or reduces current or future expenditures, to back the
principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt.
This ﬁnding also suggests that the interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary authorities
in developed economies is well described by what Sargent (1982) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985)
refer to as a Ricardian regime or, in the language of Leeper (1991), an active monetary/passive
ﬁscal policy regime. In this regime, the ﬁscal authority backs all outstanding debt, debt plays only
a minor role in the determination of the price level, and the Quantity Theory of Money holds as
a long-run proposition. Regarding their ﬁscal/monetary regimes, most industrial countries do not
seem to display signs of ﬁscal dominance.
In terms of Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) coordination game between monetary and ﬁscal au-
thorities, the results imply that, for most OECD countries in the sample, the central bank is the
ﬁrst mover. That is, the monetary authority sets its policy in advance and imposes discipline on
the ﬁscal authority, meaning that the ﬁscal authority must select a sequence of primary surpluses
(and debt) that is consistent with the sequence of Mt supplied by the monetary authority such that
the intertemporal budget constraint is always satisﬁed. In turn, this implies that the unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic might not be empirically relevant for developed economies and that “tough”
central banks can ﬁght inﬂa t i o nw i t ht i g h tm o n e y .
21leads lags
p       q estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate period 95% conf. interval
Australia 0       0 0.060 0.0000 0.163 0.0002 1.163 [ 1.081 , 1.245 ] 1950-2002 No break
Austria 0       1 0.154 0.0000 0.009 0.6700 1.009 [ 0.965 , 1.053 ] < 1986 [  1984 , 1990  ]
-0.011 0.4890 0.989 [ 0.957 , 1.021 ] > 1986
Belgium 1       3 3.000 0.1797 0.000 -0.0442 0.000 [ 0.956 , 0.949 ] 1957-1997 No break
Canada   1       1 0.035 0.0000 0.059 0.0000 1.059 [ 1.041 , 1.077 ] < 1982 [  1980 , 1983  ]
0.026 0.0000 1.026 [ 1.014 , 1.039 ] 1982-1994 [  1992 , 2003  ]
0.023 0.0000 1.023 [ 1.013 , 1.034 ] > 1994
Finland 1       1 0.148 0.0000 -0.238 0.0020 0.762 [ 0.616 , 0.907 ] < 1984 [  1982 , 1988  ]
-0.003 0.7000 0.997 [ 0.979 , 1.014 ] > 1984
France 2       1 0.151 0.0000 -0.209 0.0000 0.791 [ 0.699 , 0.882 ] < 1984 [  1982 , 1989  ]
-0.097 0.0040 0.903 [ 0.838 , 0.967 ] > 1984
Germany 1       0 0.174 0.0000 -0.264 0.0070 0.736 [ 0.548 , 0.924 ] < 1972 [  1970 , 1985  ]
-0.013 0.7210 0.987 [ 0.913 , 1.061 ] > 1972
Iceland 3       2 0.006 0.8140 0.158 0.0010 1.158 [ 1.074 , 1.243 ] < 1989 [  1987 , 1990  ]
0.088 0.0220 1.088 [ 1.014 , 1.162 ] > 1989
Italy 1       1 0.395 0.0000 -0.164 0.0000 0.836 [ 0.784 , 0.887 ] < 1986 [  1984 , 1992  ]
-0.109 0.0000 0.891 [ 0.839 , 0.943 ] > 1986
Luxembourg 0       1 -0.028 0.0163 -0.142 0.4464 0.858 [ 0.471 , 1.245 ] 1976-1997 No break
Netherlands 2       1 0.067 0.0572 0.077 0.0003 1.077 [ 1.039 , 1.115 ] 1953-1996 No break
New Zealand 0       1 0.055 0.0000 -0.030 0.0165 0.970 [ 0.945 , 0.994 ] 1972-2000 No break
Norway 0       0 0.103 0.0000 -0.046 0.2510 0.954 [ 0.873 , 1.035 ] < 1996 [  1994 , 2003  ]
-0.001 0.9830 0.999 [ 0.919 , 1.079 ] > 1996
Spain   0       1 0.272 0.0000 0.129 0.0030 1.129 [ 1.048 , 1.210 ] < 1991 [  1989 , 1993  ]
-0.060 0.1090 0.940 [ 0.865 , 1.014 ] > 1991
Sweden  1       1 0.094 0.0120 -0.148 0.3620 0.852 [ 0.529 , 1.175 ] < 1986 [  1981 , 1990  ]
0.061 0.0540 1.061 [ 0.999 , 1.123 ] 1986-1996 [  1990 , 2003  ]
0.009 0.7410 1.009 [ 0.953 , 1.065 ] > 1996
Switzerland 2       1 0.048 0.1640 0.517 0.0000 1.517 [ 1.333 , 1.701 ] < 1989 [  1987 , 1992  ]
0.127 0.0630 1.127 [ 0.992 , 1.261 ] > 1989
United Kingdom 0       1 0.048 0.0000 0.020 0.2010 1.020 [ 0.988 , 1.052 ] < 1981 [  1979 , 1982  ]
-0.008 0.5130 0.992 [ 0.967 , 1.017 ] > 1981
United States 2       1 0.116 0.0000 -0.066 0.2280 0.934 [ 0.826 , 1.043 ] < 1961 [  1960 , 1962 ]
0.004 0.8120 1.004 [ 0.969 , 1.039 ] 1961-1981 [  1979 , 1982 ]
-0.021 0.1370 0.979 [ 0.951 , 1.007 ] > 1981
Note: Breaks selected according to the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) and/or the sequential method at the 10% significance level.
95% conf. interval
Table 10(a)
DOLS Estimation of Structural Parameters (with breaks)
α1 α2 δ Breaks
22leads lags
p       q estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate period 95% conf. interval
Brazil    1       3 0.386 0.0000 0.044 0.0000 1.044 [ 1.034 , 1.054 ] < 2000 [  1998 , 2001  ]
-0.004 0.3270 0.996 [ 0.989 , 1.004 ] > 2000
Colombia 1       1 0.239 0.0000 -0.463 0.0448 0.537 [ 0.085 , 0.988 ] 1954-1986 No break
Costa Rica 1       1 0.611 0.0000 -0.762 0.0000 0.238 [ -0.066 , 0.543 ] 1953-2001 No break
El Salvador   (1) 1       1 0.026 0.0000 -0.270 0.0060 0.730 [ 0.544 , 0.916 ] < 1970 [  1968 , 1998  ]
0.054 0.0000 1.054 [ 1.028 , 1.081 ] 1970-1987 [  1985 , 1994  ]
-0.025 0.0480 0.975 [ 0.949 , 1.000 ] > 1987
El Salvador   (2) 1       1 0.027 0.0000 0.060 0.0000 1.060 [ 1.030 , 1.090 ] < 1987 [  1986 , 1988  ]
-0.029 0.0490 0.971 [ 0.942 , 1.000 ] > 1987
Guyana 1       1 0.194 0.0070 0.125 0.0000 1.125 [ 1.106 , 1.144 ] < 1990 [  1989 , 1991  ]
-0.007 0.1490 0.993 [ 0.984 , 1.003 ] > 1990
Honduras 3       1 0.252 0.0000 -0.132 0.0000 0.868 [ 0.807 , 0.929 ] < 1988 [  1986 , 1995  ]
0.023 0.4010 1.023 [ 0.968 , 1.077 ] > 1988
India 0       1 0.137 0.0026 0.075 0.0975 1.075 [ 0.986 , 1.164 ] 1962-2001 No break
Indonesia 0       1 0.144 0.0000 -0.006 0.7090 0.994 [ 0.959 , 1.029 ] < 1998 [  1997 , 1999  ]
0.104 0.0000 1.104 [ 1.070 , 1.138 ] > 1998
Israel 0       0 -0.194 0.1360 0.173 0.0290 1.173 [ 1.019 , 1.326 ] < 1997 [  1992 , 1999  ]
0.266 0.0020 1.266 [ 1.109 , 1.423 ] > 1997
South Korea 2       2 0.197 0.0000 -0.358 0.0174 0.642 [ 0.351 , 0.933 ] 1955-1997 No break
Malaysia 1       1 0.732 0.0000 -0.380 0.0000 0.620 [ 0.462 , 0.778 ] < 1987 [  1985 , 1988  ]
0.205 0.0000 1.205 [ 1.107 , 1.302 ] > 1987
Malta 1       0 1.393 0.0000 -0.957 0.0000 0.043 [ -0.102 , 0.189 ] 1961-1999 No break
Mexico   (1) 1       0 0.067 0.1610 0.039 0.7640 1.039 [ 0.944 , 1.135 ] < 1998 [  1997 , 1999  ]
0.116 0.4530 1.116 [ 0.804 , 1.428 ] > 1998
Mexico   (2) 1       0 0.191 0.0000 -0.131 0.1690 0.869 [ 0.680 , 1.058 ] < 1990 [  1989 , 1990  ]
-0.267 0.0070 0.733 [ 0.544 , 0.922 ] > 1990
Morocco 1       1 0.324 0.0010 -0.054 0.3610 0.946 [ 0.826 , 1.065 ] < 1998 [  1997 , 1998  ]
0.038 0.5970 1.038 [ 0.893 , 1.183 ] > 1998
Philippines 1       1 0.315 0.0000 -0.623 0.0000 0.377 [ 0.231 , 0.523 ] < 1984 [  1983 , 1985  ]
-0.140 0.0000 0.860 [ 0.804 , 0.916 ] > 1984
South Africa 1       1 0.117 0.0000 -0.082 0.0000 0.918 [ 0.891 , 0.945 ] < 1989 [  1987 ,  2003  ]
-0.056 0.0000 0.944 [ 0.923 , 0.964 ] > 1989
Tunisia 1       0 0.112 0.0290 0.010 0.8250 1.010 [ 0.921 , 1.098 ] < 1994 [  1991 , 1997  ]
0.027 0.5190 1.027 [ 0.942 , 1.112 ] > 1994
Notes:
(1) Breaks selected according to Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)
(2) Breaks selected according to the sequential method at the 10% significance level.
95% conf. interval
Table 10(b)
DOLS Estimation of Structural Parameters (with breaks)
α1 α2 δ Breaks
23We also explore the possibility of regime shifts in the DOLS estimation of (15) shown in Table
6. Since α1 is a “policy-free” parameter that depends only on preferences, we assume that it is
not allowed to change. Structural breaks are only allowed for α2, which means changes in the δ−
Backing Fiscal Policy Rule. Tables 10(a) and 10(b) show results based on the Bai-Perron procedure
for the estimation of linear models with multiple structural changes (Bai and Perron 1998, 2003).
In the estimations, a maximum number of two breaks are allowed to be endogenously determined
by the data.
Notice that [see Table 10(a)] among OECD economies, even though breaks are found in all but
ﬁve countries in the subsample, results tend to conﬁrm those of Table 6. In general, the identiﬁed
structural breaks in b δ do not imply big qualitative changes in terms of the degree of ﬁscal dominance
in OECD countries. Countries for which high values of b δ were reported in Table 6 also display point
estimates of b δ that are close to 1 both before and after the breaks. The exceptions are Finland,
France, Germany, and Sweden17, all of which seem to have moved from a higher degree of ﬁscal
dominance (0.76,0.79,0.74, and 0.85, respectively) to a higher degree of central bank independence
as the b δ estimates obtained for the post-break periods are closer to 1, in line with the results of
Table 6. For two countries, Sweden and the United States, two structural breaks are found, but in
both cases b δ is not statistically diﬀerent from 1 both pre- and post-breaks. Estimates of b δ that are
statistically higher than 1 are found in Canada, Iceland, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland.
Similarly, among developing countries [see Table 10(b)], no breaks are found in ﬁve countries,
and results are consistent with the no-break DOLS estimation shown in Table 6. Important struc-
tural changes in the form of increases in the degree of ﬁscal dominance seem to have taken place
in Honduras, Malaysia, and Philippines. A signiﬁcant reduction in b δ is found for Mexico. 18
To summarize, the results of this section are as follows:
1. Most of the industrial countries and some developing countries can be reasonably described
as economies with low degrees of ﬁscal dominance and/or higher levels of central bank inde-
pendence. Fiscal dominance is more common in developing countries.
2 .T h ed e g r e eo fﬁscal dominance is lower on average among OECD countries
The empirical results discussed above are consistent with ﬁndings in Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh
(2002). These authors use annual panel data from 133 market economies and report that the
expected negative relationship between ﬁscal balance and inﬂation is not veriﬁed for low-inﬂation,
mostly developed, countries. A possible explanation of their ﬁnding is that in a ﬁscal regime of zero
17Although in the case of Sweden, the coeﬃcient is not statistically diﬀerent from 1 in all subperiods, both before
and after the breaks.
18Two diﬀerent criteria for the selection of break dates are used, the Schwarz or Bayesian Information Criteria,
and a sequential method described in Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). Usually, they produce the same results, but El
Salvador and Mexico are exceptions.
24ﬁscal dominance, government debt plays no role in the determination of the price level. This point
is related to Sargent’s (1982) observation that “one cannot necessarily prove that current deﬁcits
are not inﬂationary by running time-series regressions and ﬁnding a negligible eﬀect.” The reason
is that the question of whether budget deﬁcits are inﬂationary is intimately related to the policy
regime and institutional arrangements.
Results for the U.S. economy are also in line with previous work by Bohn (1998) and Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2001), which suggest that ﬁscal authorities respond to the level of debt by raising
primary surpluses. Bohn ﬁnds that, in the United States, an increase in government debt by $100
leads to an increase in the primary surplus by $5.40 in the following year. Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2001) use impulse-response analysis to examine the response of U.S. government debt to a
positive innovation in the primary surplus (including seigniorage revenue) and report a negative,
persistent, and statistically signiﬁcant debt response that is explained as the government paying
oﬀ some of its previously accumulated debt.
3.4 Additional Implications
This subsection examines some additional empirical implications of the model. First, it may be
helpful to compare the measure of ﬁscal dominance obtained here with indices of central bank
independence (CBI) available in the literature (for a survey, see Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto
2006). The comparison with indices of central bank independence is motivated by the idea that δ
summarizes the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary authorities in a given institutional setup,
meaning not only the legal characteristics of the central bank’s organic law, but also to the informal
policy decision-making in practice. Hence, estimates of δ obtained from actual data may capture
both formal and informal behavioral elements.
Some CBI indices are constructed on the basis of scores, or points, attached to diﬀerent legal
aspects of central bank operation (Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992; Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini 1991; Eijﬃnger and Schaling 1993; Alesina and Summers 1993).19 They measure central
bank independence by focusing primarily on legal characteristics like the terms of oﬃce of the
central bank director(s), restrictions on public sector borrowing from the central bank, conﬂict
resolution between the central bank and the executive branch, etc.
However, since de jure central bank independence may be very diﬀerent from de facto autonomy
from the ﬁscal authority, Cuckierman (1992) and Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) propose
the use of the average turnover rate of central bank governors. Sturn and Haan (2001) update
those studies to include more countries in the sample. The idea is that above a certain threshold
this indicator may be a proxy for actual central bank independence, which makes it less relevant
for developed economies. Rather than autonomy, low turnover rates may reﬂect subordination
19See also Bade and Parkin (1982).
25of governors who want to keep their jobs, but high enough turnover rates may imply a higher
likelihood that the term of oﬃce of the governor is shorter than the average term of a government,
which dissuades the central bank from taking a long term view of monetary policy.
Table 11 displays the correlations between a δ−based CBI index and other indices. Correlations
with the value of the point estimate, b δ, are also presented. The δ−based CBI index is computed
a c c o r d i n gt ot h ea v e r a g eo fs c o r e su s i n gt h e following mapping from the country-speciﬁcp o i n t
estimates and (95% conﬁdence interval) lower bounds, b δL, to a scale from 1 to 5:
Estimated b δ, b δL Score
≥ 0.99 5.0
∈ [0.95 , 0.99) 4.5
∈ [0.90 , 0.95) 4.0
∈ [0.85 , 0.90) 3.5
∈ [0.80 , 0.85) 3.0
∈ [0.75 , 0.80) 2.5
∈ [0.50 , 0.75) 2.0
< 0.50 1.0
Note that the expected positive correlation between the δ−based CBI index and de jure CBI
indices is only statistically signiﬁcant when considering the GMT autonomy index by Grilli, Mas-
ciandaro and Tabellini (1991), which is only available for 11 OECD countries in our sample. Figure
1 shows the positive relationship between the δ−based CBI index and the GMT index.
legal turnover AS political economic overall ES SH
δ-cbi:
corr. 0.0185 -0.4310 0.1737 0.2283 0.5425 0.4710 -0.1599 0.1511
df 30 29 12 11 11 11 7 12
t-stat 0.102 -2.572 0.611 0.778 2.142 1.771 -0.429 0.530
p-value 0.9198 0.0155 0.5526 0.4531 0.0554 0.1043 0.6810 0.6061
δ:
corr. -0.0491 -0.4742 0.1216 0.2267 0.4154 0.3930 -0.1093 0.1319
df 30 29 12 11 11 11 7 12
t-stat -0.2694 -2.9003 0.4242 0.7719 1.5148 1.4175 -0.2910 0.4609
p-value 0.7895 0.0070 0.6789 0.4565 0.1580 0.1840 0.7795 0.6531
Notes:
CWN = Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992)
GMT = Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabelini (1991)
ES = Eijffinger and Schaling (1993)
SH = Sturn and Haan (2001)
AS: Alesina and Summers (1993)
CWN GMT
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Figure 1: Relationship between δ-CBI and GMT’s Economic Autonomy Index
However, the legal CBI index by Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992), which includes 30
countries from our sample, both industrialized and developing economies, is not correlated with
the δ−based measure of CBI (see Figure 2). This suggests that δ may capture legal aspects of CBI
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Figure 2: Relationship between δ-CBI and CWN’s Legal CBI Index
In addition, considering the CBI indices based on the turnover rate of central bank governors
by Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and Sturn and Haan (2001), respectively CWN and SH,
Table 11 shows that only the former has the expected negative correlation with the δ−based CBI
index. This may be explained by the fact that the SH index, unlike the CWN index, does not
27cover the same time sample used in our estimations of δ. Figure 3 shows the negative relationship
between the δ−based CBI index and CWN’s CBI index based on the turnover rate. The fact that
the negative correlation is highly signiﬁcant suggests that the turnover rate may better capture de
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Figure 3: Relationship between δ-CBI and CWN’s Turnover Rate
Finally, using the actual data on M, B and c (real consumption), and the country-speciﬁcp a r a -
meters estimated from the model, predictions for the average rate of inﬂation can be constructed.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that the model can approximate reasonably well the inﬂation rates
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Figure 4(b): Inﬂation in Developing Countries: Model vs. Data
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper uses a simple inﬁnite-horizon monetary economy to study how ﬁscal and monetary
policy interact to determine the aggregate price level. The government behavior is summarized
by a long-run ﬁscal policy rule, where a fraction of the outstanding debt is backed by the present
discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by the
present discounted value of current and future seigniorage revenue. Economies may thus be indexed
by the fraction of the debt backed by the ﬁscal authority. Only when the degree of ﬁscal dominance
is zero, and the debt is fully backed by ﬁscal policy, is the price level determined by the stock of
money alone. More generally, the proportion of debt backed by money behaves like money itself
for the purpose of determining the price level.
Simple unit root econometrics techniques are employed to identify the parameter that indexes
the policy regimes from the long-run dynamics of nominal money stock, consumption, and govern-
ment debt. Results suggest that (i)aﬁscal/monetary regime with a low degree ﬁscal dominance is
a reasonable approximation for most OECD economies and for some developing countries, (ii)o n
average, developing countries have a higher degree of ﬁscal dominance than OECD countries, and
(iii) ﬁscal dominance is more frequent among developing countries than in developed economies.
In addition, it is also shown that the estimates of the parameter that determines the degree of
ﬁscal dominance/central bank independence correlate positively with some institutional measures
of central bank independence, especially those based on de facto, rather than de jure, or legal,
autonomy of central banks from the ﬁscal authority.
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